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In this paper we discuss the threat of malware targeted at extracting information about the relationships in a
real-world social network as well as characteristic information about the individuals in the network, which we
dub Stealing Reality. We present Stealing Reality (SR), explain why it differs from traditional types of network
attacks, and discuss why its impact is significantly more dangerous than that of other attacks. We also present
our initial analysis and results regarding the form that an SR attack might take, with the goal of promoting the
discussion of defending against such an attack, or even just detecting the fact that one has already occurred.
I. INTRODUCTION
History has shown that whenever something has a tangible
value associated with it, there will always be those who try
to malevolently ‘game’ the system for profit. These days, the
field of social networks is experiencing exponential growth
in popularity while in parallel, computational social science
[1] and network science [2–4] are providing real-world ap-
plicable methods and results with a demonstrated monetary
value. We conjecture that the world will increasingly see mal-
ware integrating tools and mechanism from network science
into its arsenal, as well as attacks that directly target human-
network information as a goal rather than a means. Paraphras-
ing Marshall McLuhan’s “the medium is the message,” we
have reached the stage where, now, “the network is the mes-
sage.”
Social networking concepts could be discussed both in the
context of malware’s means of spreading, as well as in the
context of its target goal. Many existing viruses and worms
use primitive forms of ‘social engineering’ [5] as a means of
spreading, in order to gain the trust of their next victims and
cause them to click on a link or install an application. For ex-
ample, ‘Happy99’ was one of the first viruses to attach itself to
outgoing emails, thus increasing the chances of having the re-
cipient open an attachment to a seemingly legitimate message
sent by a known acquaintance [6]. Sometimes the malware’s
originators use similar techniques to seed the attack. A more
recent example is ‘Operation Aurora’, a sophisticated attack
originating in China against dozens of US companies during
the first half of 2009, where the attack was initiated via links
spread through a popular Korean Instant Messaging applica-
tion [7]. Nevertheless, the current discussion focuses more on
the second context — in which the human network structure
itself is the goal of the attack.
When discussing the goal of learning a network’s structure,
it is important to distinguish between the “technical” topol-
ogy of a digital network and the actual topology of the human
network that communicates on top of it — which is what we
are actually interested in. Technically, every phone or com-
puter can reach nearly any other on the planet, but in practice
it will only contact a small subset, based on the context of its
user. Many existing network attacks gather information on the
digital network topology, usually in order to leverage the at-
tack itself. Some attacks, for example, make use of an email
program’s address book or a mobile phone’s contact list to
spread further. In the context of Stealing Reality, this method
is not as useful, since a majority of peers would not be con-
tacted on a routine basis. There is a great deal of informa-
tion in the patterns of communication exercised by the user
with his peers. These patterns are affected by many factors of
relationship and context, and could be used in reverse — to
infer the relationship and context. In addition the communi-
cation patterns, combined with other behavioral data that can
be harvested from mobile devices, could serve to teach a great
deal of information about the user himself — their age, their
occupation and role, their personality, and a great deal more.
This type of information could be summarized as a “rich iden-
tity” profile of a person [8], which is much more informative
than direct demographic information which is currently used
to profile users, and could be very valuable to advertisers and
spammers, for example.
Expanding from an individual’s egotistical network, the so-
cial network as a whole has intricate relationships and topolo-
gies among cliques and sub-groups, which may be both over-
lapping as well as residing in multiple hierarchies. This is
complicated even more by issues of like trust or influence.
The fact that three people know each other does not necessar-
ily mean that information received by one will propagate in
the same format to the two peers, if at all. Computational so-
cial science has shown that many of these aspects of a social
network could be learned and extracted from communication
patterns [8].
In this paper we discuss the ability to steal vital pieces of
information concerning networks and their users, by a non-
aggressive (and hence — harder to detect) malware agent. We
analyze this threat and build a mathematical model capable
of predicting the optimal attack strategy against various net-
works. Using data from real-world mobile networks we show
that indeed, in many cases a “stealth attack” (one that is hard
to detect, however, and steals private information at a slow
pace) can result in the maximal amount of overall knowledge
captured by the operator of this attack. This attack strategy
also makes sense when compared to the natural human so-
cial interaction and communication patterns, as we discuss in
our concluding section. The rest of the paper is organized as
follows: Sections II and III expand on the motivation behind
reality stealing attacks and their dangers. Section IV describes
the threat model and its analysis, while Section V presents our
preliminary empirical results. Concluding remarks are given
in Section VI.
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FIG. 1: The evolution of ΛS as a function of the overall percentage of edges learned, for networks of same number of edges, but different
values of Kolmogorov complexity.
II. MOTIVATION FOR STEALING REALITY
Many commercial entities have realized the value of in-
formation derived from communication and other behavioral
data for a great deal of applications, like marketing cam-
paigns, customer retention, security screening, recommender
systems, etc. There is no reason to think that developers of
malicious applications will not implement the same methods
and algorithms into future malware, or that they have not al-
ready started doing so.
There already exist secondary markets for resale of this type
of information, such as infochimps.com, or black market
sites and chat-rooms for resale of stolen identity information
and other illegal data sets [9]. It is reasonable to assume that
a social hub’s email address would worth more to an adver-
tiser than an edge node. It is also reasonable to assume that
a person meeting the profile of a student might be priced dif-
ferently than that of a corporate executive or a homemaker.
There are already companies operating in the legal grey area,
which engage in the collection of email and demographic in-
formation with the intention of selling it [10]. Why work hard
when one can set loose automatic agents that would collect
the same if not better quality information? Wang et al. predict
that once the market share of any specific mobile operating
system reaches a computable phase transition point, viruses
could pose a serious threat to mobile communications [11].
One might also imagine companies performing this types
of attacks on a competitor’s customers (to figure out which
customers to try and recruit), or even operations performed by
one country on another. Finally, the results of an SR attack
might be later used for selecting the best targets for future
attacks or configuring the ‘social engineering’ components of
other attacks.
III. WHY STEALING REALITY ATTACKS ARE SO
DANGEROUS
One of the biggest risks of real world social network in-
formation being stolen is that this type is very static, espe-
cially when compared to traditional targets of malicious at-
tacks. Data network topologies and identifiers could be re-
placed with the press of a button. The same goes for pass-
words, usernames, or credit cards. An infected computer
could be wiped and re-installed. An online email, instant mes-
senger, or social networking account could be easily replaced
with a similar one, and the users’ contacts can be quickly
warned of the original account’s breach.
However, it is much harder to change one’s network of real
world, person-to-person relationships, friendships, or family
ties. The victim of a “behavioral pattern” theft cannot eas-
ily change her behavior and life patterns. Plus this type of
information, once out, would be very hard to contain. In addi-
tion, once the information has been extracted in digital form,
it would be quite hard if not impossible to make sure that all
copies have been deleted.
There are many stories in recent years of “reality” infor-
mation being stolen and irreversibly be put in the open. In
2008, real life identity information of millions of Korean cit-
izens was stolen in a series of malicious attacks and posted
for sale [7]. In 2007, Israel Ministry of Interior’s database
with information on all of the country’s citizens was leaked
30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
x 105
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Kolmogorov Complexity
Cr
itic
al
 L
ea
rn
in
g 
Th
re
sh
ol
d
Easily Learnable Network Threshold
FIG. 2: An illustration of the easily learnable network notion. The graph depicts the critical learning threshold Λ̂E for networks of 1, 000, 000
nodes, as a function of increasing values of the Kolmogorov complexity. Notice how networks for which KE < max
{
0, |E| − |E|
ln(|E|)
}
are
easily learnable, while more complex networks require significantly larger amounts of information in order to be able to accelerate the network
learning process.
and posted on the Web [12]. Just these days, a court sill has
to rule whether the database of bankrupt gay dating site for
teenagers will be sold to raise money for repaying its credi-
tors. The site includes personal information of over a million
teenage boys [13]. In all of these cases, once the informa-
tion is out, there is no way back, and the damage is felt for
a long time thereafter. In a recent Wall Street Journal inter-
view, Google CEO Eric Schmidt referred to the possibility
that people in the future might choose to legally change their
name in order to detach themselves from embarrassing “real-
ity” information publically exposed in social networking sites
[14]. Speculative as this might be, it demonstrates the sensi-
tivity and challenges in recovering from leakage of real-life
information, whether by youthful carelessnes or by malicious
extraction through an attack.
For this reason, Stealing Reality attacks are much more
dangerous than traditional malware attacks. The difference
between SR attacks vs. more traditional forms of attacks
should be treated with the same graveness as nonconventional
weapons compared to conventional ones. The remainder of
this document presents our initial analysis and results regard-
ing the form that an SR attack might take, in contrast to the
characteristics of conventional malware attacks.
IV. THREAT MODEL
In this section we describe and analyze the threat model.
First, we define the attacker’s goals in the terms of our model,
and develop a quantitative measure for assessing the progress
in achieving these goals. Then, we present an analytical model
to predict the success rate of various attacks. Finally, we pro-
vide an assessment for the best strategies for devising such
an attack. We demonstrate both based on analytical mod-
els as well as using real mobile network data, that in many
cases the best attack strategy is counter intuitively a “low-
aggressiveness attack”. Besides yielding the best outcome for
the attacker, such an attack may also deceive existing mon-
itoring tool, due to its low traffic volumes and the fact that
it imitates natural end-user communication patterns (or even
“piggibacks” on actual messages).
A. Network Model
We shall model the network as an undirected graph
G(V,E). The difficulty of learning the relevant information
of the network’s nodes and edges may be different for differ-
ent nodes and for different edges. In general, we denote the
probability that vertex u was successfully “learned” or “ac-
quired” by an attacking agent that was installed on u at time 0
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FIG. 3: An observational study of the overall amount of data that can be captured as a function of ρ — the attack’s aggressiveness. Notice the
local maximum around ρ = 0.5 that is outperformed by the global maximum at ρ = 0.04.
as pV (u, t). Similarly, we shall denote the probability that an
edge e(u, v) was successfully learned at time t by an agent in-
stalled on it at time 0 as pE(u, t). We shall denote the presence
of an attacking agent on a vertex u at time t by the following
Boolean indicator:
Iu(t) = 1 iff u is infected at time t
Similarly, we shall denote the presence of an attacking
agent on an edge e(u, v) at time t as:
Ie(t) = 1 iff either u or v or both are infected at time t
For each vertex u and edge e, let the times Tu and Te denote
their initial time of infection.
B. Attacker’s Goal: Stealing Reality
As information about the network itself has become a wor-
thy cause for an attack, the attacker’s motivation is stealing
as much properties related to the network’s social topology as
possible. The percentage of vertices-related information ac-
quired at time t is therefore:
ΛV (t) =
1
|V |
∑
u∈V
Iu(t) · pV (u, t− Tu)
Similarly, the percentage of edges-related information ac-
quired at time t is :
ΛE(t) =
1
|E|
∑
e∈E
Ie(t) · pE(e, t− Te)
As an extension in the spirit of Metcalfe’s [15] and Reed’s
Law [16], a strong value emerges from learning the “social
principles” behind a network. Understanding essence behind
the implied social network is more valuable (and also requires
much more information in order to learn) as the information
it encapsulates is greater. For example, let us imagine the fol-
lowing two mobile social networks:
1. For every two users ui, uj , the users are connected if
and only if they joined the network on the same month.
2. For every two users ui, uj , the users are connected in
probability p = 12 .
It is easy to see that given a relatively small subset of net-
work 1, the logic behind its social network can be discovered
quite easily. Once this logic is discovered, the rest of the net-
work can automatically be generated (as edges are added ex-
actly for pairs of users who joined the network at the same
month). Specifically, for every value of ǫ we can calculate a
relatively small number of queries that we should ask in or-
der to be able to restore the complete network with mistake
probability of 1 − ǫ. However, for network 2 the situation is
much different, as the only strategy for accurately obtaining
the network is actually discovering all the edges it comprised
of.
Let us denote by KE the Kolmogorov Complexity [17] of
the network, namely — the minimal number of bit required in
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FIG. 4: An extensive study of a real-life mobile network of 7, 706 nodes and 17, 404 edges. Each graph presents the performance of a Stealing
Reality attack for a specific different set of values of α, β, σ,M, ri. The performance is measured as the percentage of information acquired,
as a function of the infection rate ρ. The scenarios that are presented in this figure demonstrate a global optimum of the attack performance
for very low values of ρ. In other words, for many different scenarios it is best to use a very non-aggressive attack, which would result in
maximizing the amount of network information obtained. Values of α and β which had demonstrated this behavior were between 10 and 500.
Values of ri were between 0.1 and 100, whereas the values of σ were between 0.1 and 12. The values of M were between 0.1 and 30. It is
interesting to mention that for high values of α and β, low values of M did display this phenomenon while high values of M did not.
order to “code” the network in such a way that it could later
be completely restored. As the number of vertices |V | is as-
sumed to be known, the essence of the network is coded in
its edges. Dividing the number of edges learned |E|ΛE(t) by
the number of “redundant edges” |E|−KE yields the amount
of information learned at time t. Following a similar logic of
Reed’s Law we shall evaluate the benefit of the learning pro-
cess proportionally to the number of combinations that can be
composed from the information learned. Normalizing it by the
number of edges, we shall receive the following measurement
for the social essence learned:
ΛS(t) = 2
|E|ΛE(t)−|E|
|E|−KE
The attacker in interested in maximizing the values of
ΛV (t), ΛE(t) and ΛS(t). The evolution of the ΛS , the so-
cial essence of the network, as a function of the “complexity
hardness” of the network is illustrated in Figure 1.
C. Attack Analysis
We assume that the learning process of vertices and edges
follows the well-known Gompertz function, namely:
∀et ∈ E , pE(e, t) = e
−αe−ri(t)
∀ut ∈ V , pV (u, t) = e
−βe−ri(t)
with α and β representing the efficiency of the learning mech-
anism used by the attacker, as well as the amount of informa-
tion that is immediately obtained upon installation. ri denotes
the learning rate of each edge vertex, determined by the ac-
tivity level of the edge vertex (namely — accumulation of
new information). Variable ri is also used for normalizing α
and β. Hence, the attack success rates can now be written as
follows:
ΛV (t) =
1
|V |
∑
ui∈V
Iui(t) · e
−βe−ri(t−Tui )
ΛE(t) =
1
|E|
∑
ei∈E
Iei(t) · e
−αe−ri(t−Tei )
Attacking agents spread through movements on network
edges. Too aggressive infection is more likely to be detected,
6causing the accumulation of information concerning the net-
work to be blocked altogether. On the other hand, attack
agents that spread too slowly may evade detection for a long
period of time, however, the amount of data they gather would
still be very limited. In order to predict the detection probabil-
ity of attacking agents at time t we shall use Richard’s Curve,
for as follows :
pdetect(t) =
1(
1 + e−ρ(t−M)
) 1
ρ
σ
where ρ is the probability that an agent would copy itself
to a neighboring vertex at each time step, σ is a normalizing
constant for the detection mechanism, and M denotes the nor-
malizing constant for the system’s initial state. Let Nt denote
the number of infected vertices at time t. Assuming that ver-
tices infection by their infected neighbors is a random process,
the number of infected vertices vertex u would have at time t
is :
Nt ·
deg(u)
|V |
The probability that vertex u would be attacked at time t
equals therefore at least:
pattack(u, t) = 1− e
−Nt·ρ·
deg(u)∑
v∈V deg(v)
and the expected number of infected vertices is :
Nt+∆t = |V | −
∑
vinV
t∏
i=0
(1− pattack(v, i))
The number of infected nodes therefore grows as :
Nt+∆t = |V | −
∑
vinV
t∏
i=0
e
−Ni·ρ
deg(v)
2|E|
From Nt we can now derive the distribution of the Boolean
infection indicators :
p[Iu(t) = 1] =
Nt
|V |
p[Ie(t) = 1] = 2
Nt
|V |
−
N2t
|V |2
And the attack probability can now be given as follows :
pattack(u, t+∆t) =
1− eρ
deg(u)
2|E| (−|V |+
∑
v∈V
∏
t
i=0(1−pattack(v,i)))
This expression can now be used for calculating the dis-
tribution of initial infection times of vertices and edges. Note
that information is gathered faster as infection rate ρ increases.
However, so does the detection probability. The optimum can
therefore be derived by calculating the expectance of the total
amount of information obtained (in which the only free pa-
rameter is ρ) :
ΛE =
∫ ∞
0
(
∂ΛE(t)
∂t
· (1− pdetect(t))
)
dt
ΛV =
∫ ∞
0
(
∂ΛV (t)
∂t
· (1− pdetect(t))
)
dt
D. Obtaining the Social Essence of a Network
Recalling the expression that represents the progress of
learning the “social essence” of a network, we can see that
initially each new edge contributes O(1) information, and the
overall amount of information is therefore kept proportional
to O( 1|E|). As the learning progresses and the logic principles
behind the network’s structure start to unveil, the amount of
information gathered from new edges becomes greater than
their linear value. At this point, the overall amount of infor-
mation becomes greater than O( 1|E| ), and the benefit of ac-
quiring the social structure of the network starts to accelerate.
Formally, we can see that this phase is reached when:
ΛE(t) > O
(
1−
|E| −KE
|E|
ln(|E|)
)
Let us denote by Λ̂E the Critical Learning Threshold,
above which the learning process of the networks accelerates,
as described above (having each new learned edge contribut-
ing an increasingly growing amount of information concern-
ing the network’s structure), to be defined as follows:
Λ̂E , 1−
|E| −KE
|E|
ln(|E|)
Consequently, in order to provide as strong protection for
the network as possible, we should make sure that for every
value of t:
∑
ei∈E
Iei(t) · e
−αe−ri(t−Tei ) < |E| − (|E| −KE) ln(|E|)
Alternatively, the attack would prevail when there exist a
time t for which the above no longer holds.
Notice that as pointed out above, “weaker” networks
(namely, networks of low Kolmogorov complexity) are easy
to learn using a limited amount of information. Generaliz-
ing this notion, the following question can be asked : How
7“simple” must a network be, in order for it to be “easily learn-
able” (namely, presenting an superlinear learning speed, start-
ing from the first edges learned)?
It can be seen that in order for a network to be easily
learnable, its critical learning threshold Λ̂E must equal O(1).
Namely, the network’s Kolmogorov complexity must satisfy:
1−
|E| −KE
|E|
ln(|E|) < O(1)
We must obtain the following criterion for easily learnable
networks:
KE < |E| −
|E|
ln(|E|)
The notion of an easily learnable network is illustrated in Fig-
ure 2, presenting the critical learning threshold Λ̂E for net-
works of 1, 000, 000 nodes, as a function of the network’s
Kolmogorov complexity.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have evaluated our model on aggregated call logs de-
rived from a real mobile phone network, comprised of ap-
proximately 200, 000 nodes and 800, 000 edges. These tests
have clearly shown that in many cases, an “aggressive attack”
achieves inferior results compared to more subtle attacks. Fur-
thermore, although sometimes the optimal value for the infec-
tion rate revolves around 50%, there are scenarios in which
there is a local maximum around this value, with a global
maximum around 4%. Figure 3 demonstrates the attack effi-
ciency (namely, the maximal amount of network information
acquired) as a function of its “aggressiveness” (i.e. the at-
tack’s infection rate). A global optimum both for the vertices
information as well as for the edges information is achieved
around 4%, with a local optimum around 52%.
A more extensive simulation research was conducted for
an arbitrary sub-network of this mobile network, containing
7, 706 edges and 17, 404 edges. In this research we have ex-
tensively studied the success of a Stealing Reality attack using
numerous different sets of values (i.e. α, β, ri, σ and M ). Al-
though the actual percentage of stolen information had varied
significantly between the various sets, many of them had dis-
played the same interesting phenomenon — a global optimum
for the performance of the attack, located around a very low
value of ρ. Some of these scenarios are presented in Figure 4.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we discussed the threat of malware targeted at
extracting information about the relationships in a real-world
social network as well as characteristic information about the
individuals in the network, which we name “Stealing Real-
ity”. We present Stealing Reality (SR), explain why it differs
from traditional types of network attacks, and discuss why its
impact is significantly more dangerous than that of other at-
tacks. We also present our initial analysis and results regard-
ing the form that an SR attack might take. We have evaluated
our model on data derived from a real mobile network. Our
results clearly show that an “aggressive attack” achieves in-
ferior results compared to more subtle attacks. This attack
strategy also makes sense when comparing it to natural hu-
man social interaction and communication patterns. The rate
of human communication and evolution of relationship is very
slow compared to traditional malware attack message rates. A
Stealing Reality type of attack, which is targeted at learning
the social communication patterns, could “piggyback” on the
user generated messages, or imitate their natural patterns, thus
not drawing attention to itself while still acheiving its target
goals.
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